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FRAMEWORK FOR M&S WITH AGENTS
IN REGARD TO AGENT SIMULATIONS IN SOCIAL SCIENCES:
EMULATION AND SIMULATION
Franck VARENNE 1
Abstract –  e aim of this paper is to discuss the “Framework for M&S with 
Agents” (FMSA) proposed by Zeigler et al. [2000, 2009] in regard to the 
diverse epistemological aims of agent simulations in social sciences. We ﬁ rst 
show that there surely are great similitudes, hence that the aim to emu-
late a universal “automated modeler agent” opens new ways of interactions 
between these two domains of M&S with agents. E.g., it can be shown that 
the multi-level conception at the core of the FMSA is similar in both con-
texts: notions of “levels of system speciﬁ cation”, “behavior of models”, “simu-
lator” and “endomorphic agents” can be partially translated in the terms 
linked to the “denotational hierarchy” (DH) and recently introduced in a 
multi-level centered epistemology of M&S. Second, we suggest considering 
the question of “credibility” of agent M&S in social sciences when we do 
not try to emulate but only to simulate target systems. Whereas a stringent 
and standardized treatment of the heterogeneous internal relations (in the 
DH) between systems of formalisms is the key problem and the essential 
challenge in the scope of Agent M&S driven engineering, it is urgent too to 
address the problem of the external relations (and of the external validity, 
hence of the epistemic power and credibility) of such levels of formalisms in 
the speciﬁ c domains of agent M&S in social sciences, especially when we 
intend to introduce the concepts of activity tracking.
Keywords – Framework of M&S with agents, Agent-simulation, Agent-
based modeling, emulation, social sciences, epistemology, credibility 
of models, denotational hierarchy.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in the sciences of complex systems (integrative biology, cogni-
tive economics, computational sociology, etc.) show the spreading of com-
plex multi-level systems of models and simulations [Varenne, 2009a-b]. 
Due to multiple imbrications of types of symbols and of types of computa-
tions, the epistemic status of such complex simulations is most of the time 
problematic. New questions arise: for which reason, according to which 
criteria, can we decide that a given complex computer simulation is only 
a calculus of a model, or a conceptual exploration, or a credible world or 
a virtual experiment [Sugden, 2002]? It is probable that this status is not 
decidable only by looking at the types of the used models nor by look-
ing at the type of simulator – or computational template – at stake [Phan 
and Varenne, 2008]. Facing some similar considerations on the increasing 
complexity of simulations, Winsberg [2009] claims that we have to adopt a 
deferetentialist epistemology: i.e., we ultimately have to defer to the beliefs 
of the modeler and to his expertise in his domain in order to ﬁ nd and legiti-
mate the epistemic status of each complex computer simulation (CS).
Although it surely is a cautious strategy to defer to specialists of the domain 
when modeling, this strategy is not systematically working when you have 
to work with many diﬀ erent disciplines at the same time (such as sociol-
ogy, psychology, ecology and economics, as you can see now in some com-
plex multi-level and multidisciplinary CS). Here, the problem relies on 
the diversity of regional – i.e. disciplinary – epistemologies of models and 
simulations. " e problem is exactly this one: it does not suﬃ  ce to have a 
common framework and ontology for your formalisms to have the possibil-
ity to ﬁ nd an agreement between the epistemological standpoints and com-
mitments of various specialists on the epistemic status of the complex CS 
in question. Even when a meta-aspectual point of view is available (thanks 
to the availability of a common ontology), you cannot be sure that a com-
mon epistemological standpoint will automatically arise from this common 
ontology. Having a common – minimal – ontology does not guarantee that 
you will have a common – even minimal – epistemology. Both are largely 
independent. Hence, the question can be asked: if you adopt a deferentialist 
epistemology to evaluate the epistemic status of a complex multidisciplinary 
CS, which specialist will you have to defer to? Undoubtedly, the need for 
some new epistemological reﬂ ections reappears in this context of complex 
multimodeling and CS.
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" e ﬁ rst thing we can say is that the origin of the diﬃ  culty lies in the fact 
that the problem of the validation of models and simulations is not only a 
problem of internal validity between types of systems, nor only a problem of 
external validity of formalisms in regard to data. It is a mix of the two.
According to Guala (2003),
" e result of an experiment E is internally valid if the experimenter 
attributes the production of an eﬀ ect B to a factor (or set of fac-
tors) A, and A really is the (or a) cause of B in E. Furthermore, it is 
externally valid if A causes B not only in E, but also in a set of other 
circumstances of interest, F, G, H, etc.
[…]
Whereas internal validity is fundamentally a problem of identifying 
causal relations, external validity involves an inference to the robust-
ness of a causal relation outside the narrow circumstances in which it 
was observed and established in the ﬁ rst instance.
In fact, in complex CS, there is a tremendous mix between the questions 
of external validity and the questions of internal validity. " is is the rea-
son why a deferentialist epistemology is partly right: implementers have 
to beware of the importance of that deference to experts of the domains to 
evaluate the epistemic status of their models & CS. But this is the reason 
why this epistemological strategy does not suﬃ  ce either.
" e aim of this paper is to introduce conceptual distinctions between the 
notions of model, simulation and emulation in relation to a hierarchical 
presentation of symbols so as to provide conceptual tools for facilitating the 
elucidation of this problem. In particular, by using the recent discriminat-
ing and referentialist interpretation of models and complex CS [Phan and 
Varenne, 2008] based on the concept of denotational hierarchy between 
symbols [Goodman, 1981], we will show that it is possible to reinterpret 
some conceptual tools of the Framework for M&S (FMS) described in 
[Zeigler et al., 2000].
Accordingly, we will address the problem of the conception of a universal 
“automated modeler agent” [Zeigler et al., 2009] by introducing a distinc-
tion between an emulation and a simulation. From this viewpoint, emula-
tion will appear as a kind of simulation, not the only one. " is generalizing 
interpretation enables to explain the partial connections between the inter-
disciplinary question of the epistemic statuses of complex agent models and 
simulations, especially in social sciences, and the project of emulating a 
universal automated modeler agent in the context of the FMS.
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1. A REFERENTIALIST EPISTEMOLOGY OF LEVELS OF SYMBOLS
Let’s ﬁ rst remind what we recently proposed to call a “referentialist and 
multi-level centered epistemology of complex M&S” [Phan and Varenne, 
2008].
1.1. A defi nition of “Model”
Following Hill [2000], we ﬁ rst propose to base this open epistemology on 
the large deﬁ nition of a model ﬁ rst given by Minsky [1965].
To an observer B, an object A* is a model of an object A to the extent 
that B can use A* to answer questions that interest him about A.
Note that this large deﬁ nition is not large enough to take into account the 
non epistemic roles of models, i.e. those roles that are not primarily devoted 
to the acquisition of a speciﬁ c knowledge (but to the acquisition of some 
know-how or some agreement). As noted by [Yilmaz et al., 2006], models 
can be used in other contexts and for other purposes: training or entertain-
ment, for instance.
Nonetheless, as far as epistemic dimensions of models and simulations are 
central both to the community working with models in the sciences of 
complex systems and to the community working with the system theory 
approach, and as far as these communities meet on this speciﬁ c role of 
models, we can consider that this deﬁ nition remains valid for our speciﬁ c 
concern.
" is pragmatic deﬁ nition of epistemic models is interesting because it gath-
ers three important features:
An object has not to be a representation to be a model. A model is not 1. 
always a symbol or a system of symbols referring to something really 
subsisting. Here, I will take the term “symbol” as denoting any refer-
ring entity and the term “symbolization” as denoting any relation of 
referring or “standing for” [Goodman, 1981].
Although a model is not always representational, a model is not in 2. 
itself a model. " e property to be a model is pragmatically deﬁ ned 
here because, according to Minsky, an object becomes a model only 
when related to an investigator and to a speciﬁ c and contextualized 
investigation of this investigator. So, it is relatively to this investiga-
tion that an object becomes a model.
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Nevertheless, a model is still characterized as an “object” by Minsky. 3. 
Note that this does not imply that a model is necessarily a concrete 
and material object, of course. It can be an equation or an algorithm. 
But a model remains an “object” to the extent that it possesses an 
ontological independency: it is an independent entity in itself. It is 
not only a property of an autonomous entity. " is “objectivity” of 
the model is what interests us mostly because it is what justiﬁ es the 
redirection of the questioning towards the model. As an independ-
ent entity, a model presents an autonomous behavior which can be 
investigated in itself.
" is is the reason why most scientiﬁ c models today are formal constructs 
possessing a kind of unity, formal homogeneity and simplicity. " ese unity, 
simplicity and homogeneity are chosen so as to satisfy a speciﬁ c request 
(prediction, explanation, communication, decision, etc.).
Given all these listed features, the main function of a model appears more 
clearly: it is to facilitate the answering of some questions regarding a given 
investigated object.
1.2. Systems and Models
From this viewpoint, models can be seen as “systems” too, in the sense given 
by [Klir and Elias, 1985]. According to these authors, a system is a “set of 
some things and a relation among the things”, i.e. an ordered pair S = (A, R) 
where A denotes the set of relevant things and R denotes a relation among 
them. Klir and Elias state that “the term ‘relation’ is used here in a broad 
sense to encompass the whole set of kindred terms such as ‘constraint’, 
‘structure’, ‘information’, ‘organization’, ‘cohesion’, ‘interaction’, ‘coupling’, 
‘linkage’, ‘interconnection’, ‘dependence’, ‘correlation’, ‘pattern’ and the 
like”. From this system theory viewpoint, the simplicity which is sought for 
in every model lies essentially in the uniqueness of the type of relation at stake 
in the system-model.
In their book, Klir and Elias choose explicitly to focus on the types of rela-
tions and not on the types of the related things. By frankly choosing this 
basic approach for their subsequent conceptions of systems and their inter-
relations, they aim at freeing them from any interpretation, i.e. from any 
dependence to a particular scientiﬁ c discipline or specialization. Accord-
ingly, they deﬁ ne a “general system” as an “interpretation-free system cho-
sen to represent a class of systems equivalent (isomorphic) with respect to 
some relational aspects that are pragmatically relevant”. According to them, 
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it follows that the entire practice of designing and processing models can be 
classiﬁ ed in the set of theoretically – i.e. not empirically – based activities [Klir 
and Elias, 1985].
But this conclusion is problematic when we see all the literature which 
on the contrary has taken seriously into account the empirical nature of 
modeling and, especially, of simulations2. In fact, it appears that the system 
theory approach of M&S is not always ﬁ ne-grained enough for the case of 
complex simulations and for the analysis of the epistemic roles of simula-
tions. But how is it possible to characterize a simulation today?
1.3. Simulations
Before the computer era, a simulation was deﬁ ned as a kind of model. " e 
simulation of a volcano’s eruption through chemical reactions in a class-
room was seen as a phenomenological model. " at is, a simulation was a 
model that represents and mimics only the behavior (the performance) and 
not the functional structure of a real volcano.
In the 1940’s, with the arrival of the ﬁ rst digital computers in nuclear phys-
ics, a numerical calculation of an intractable mathematical model was called 
a “simulation”: ﬁ rst because analog computers were already called simu-
lators (analog computers were mimicking the target system only through 
their measurable behavior but not through their physical/structural func-
tioning), and second because a step-by-step discrete processing of symbols 
could be interpreted as a “behaviorist” – and not structuralist – processing 
of a formal model at a micro-level.
" is common emphasis on the “behavior” can be recognized too in the 
characterization of a “simulator” by [Zeigler et al., 2000]: “A simulator is 
any computation system […] capable of executing a model to generate its 
behavior”. But a simulator is not a simulation. I will come back to this topic 
later.
Because most CSs were initially founded on the processing of a unique for-
mal model, many papers characterize a computer simulation as a calculus 
of model. Simulation is presented as a kind of second order modeling, a 
temporal modeling of a model. Scholars, especially in physics, computer 
science and engineering sciences, are often used to say that “a simulation is 
a model in time”.
2. See for instance: [Varenne, 2001; Mäki, 2002; Guala, 2002, 2003; Peck, 2004; Humphreys, 2004; Varenne, 
2007; Phan et al., 2007; Guala, 2009; Winsberg, 2009].
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According to [Hill, 1996],
Simulation is carried out by causing an abstraction of a real sys-
tem (the action model) to evolve in real time in order to assist the 
understanding of the functioning and behavior of this system and to 
understand certain of its dynamic characteristics, and with the aim of 
evaluating diﬀ erent decisions.
Following this broadly accepted characterization, [Hartmann, 1996] states 
that:
Simulations are closely related to dynamic models [i.e. models with 
assumptions about the time-evolution of the system] […] More con-
cretely, a simulation results when the equations of the underlying 
dynamic model are solved. " is model is designed to imitate the time 
evolution of a real system. To put it another way, a simulation imi-
tates a process by another process.
For Parker (forthcoming work quoted by [Winsberg, 2009]), a simulation 
is:
A time-ordered sequence of states that serves as a representation of 
some other time-ordered sequence of states ; at each point in the 
former sequence, the simulating system’s having certain properties 
represents the target system’s having certain properties.
However, as noted by [Phan and Varenne, 2008], it is not always true that 
the dynamic aspect of a simulation imitates the temporal aspect of the target 
system. Sometimes, a simulation imitates neither the dynamic aspect of the 
model nor the temporal aspect of the target system.
In the case of a rule-based CS, or in the case of what is often called a “model 
of simulation”, a simulation of the model cannot imitate the dynamic aspect 
of the model because it is the simulation itself which is the dynamic aspect 
of the model, and nothing else. Moreover, in the case of a rule-based CS 
speciﬁ cally designed to produce only a ﬁ nal picture of a complex dynamic 
object (such as a botanical plant) through a computational trajectory which 
is not mimicking the real trajectory of the real system, the simulation is 
neither mimicking any dynamic model nor the temporal aspect of the tar-
get system. For instance, it is possible to simulate the growth of a botani-
cal plant sequentially and branch by branch (through a non-mimetic tra-
jectory) and not through a realistic parallelism, i.e. burgeon by burgeon 
(through a mimetic trajectory), and to obtain the same resulting and imitat-
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ing ﬁ nal image (see the case of the AMAPsim software presented in [Var-
enne, 2007]).
" erefore I have proposed to distinguish between CSs which are mimetic 
in their results from CSs which are mimetic in their trajectory. But of course, 
there exist CSs which are mimetic neither in their results nor in their tra-
jectory. Such CSs are simulations only in that they are the calculation of a 
“model of simulation” and not because they are simulations of any target 
system (be it real or ﬁ ctional).
For all these reasons, it seems no more relevant to see all simulations as 
“models in time”. It is due to the fact that the meaning and the reference of 
the term “time” are problematic here. It is even more problematic than usu-
ally thought (when the sole distinction drawn is between the real time and 
the time of the simulation) in that the meaning of “time” depends itself of 
the kind of similitude we want for this simulation.
" rough that, we understand too that the term simulation may either denote 
a simulation of a model or a simulation of an external target system with the 
help of a model or a set of models. In the former case, simulation remains an 
ancillary instrument for the model: the limited role of a simulation of model 
is to help the model generating some data that reveal the implicit behavior 
of the model. In the latter case, on the contrary, the model tends to become 
an ancillary instrument for the simulation of an external target system. So, 
to simulate through a model is not necessary to simulate a model, unless the 
term “simulation” changes its meaning in the same sentence.
Another problem with the traditional deﬁ nition of a CS is that more and 
more simulations use sets or systems of models instead of a unique and mono-
formalized model. Hence, it appears necessary to characterize a computer 
simulation apart from a central reference to a unique model. Seen from the 
viewpoint of the mathematical system theory, and particularly because of its 
property of closure under composition, this point can surely be overcome. In 
fact, this is one of the most powerful and interesting properties of the DEVS 
approach in M&S: a system of model is always assumed to be a model itself. 
But [Recanati, 2008], who is working on computer simulations of hybrid 
reasoning, has shown that it is not necessary to have a formalized metalan-
guage to enable computable interactions between ontologies. In this con-
text, some iconic aspect of ontologies (e.g.: the form of the basis symbols) 
are used to bypass the recourse to any global metalanguage.
So, because questions on the kinds of “similitude” and “iconicity” of sym-
bols at stake in a CS seem to persist and even re-emerge (e.g. if we want to 
clarify the meaning of “time” in this context, or if we want to determine 
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whether a CS simulates a model or an external target system, or if we want 
to decide whether the simulation is a unique model in time or not), I sug-
gest characterizing simulation apart from the notion of model. As a con-
sequence, the temporal dimension of simulations itself will appear as an 
iconic aspect among others in any simulation: as we have seen, temporality 
can be deﬁ ned through iconicity, but the converse is not true. So, the gen-
eral term of symbolization (“denoting all cases of standing for” [Goodman, 
1981] and itself implied by the notion of iconicity) seems to be a more 
fundamental term than “time” or “behavior” as far as a characterization of 
simulation – even of CS – is concerned.
1.4. A characterization of simulations
Two caveats: ﬁ rst, I will give a characterization and not a deﬁ nition of a 
simulation; i.e., it is possible to ﬁ nd processes which could be characterized 
that way without being properly considered as simulations. But my claim is 
that any simulation can be described this way. Second, note that this char-
acterization refers neither to an absolute similitude (be it formal or material) 
nor to a unique dynamical model:
Generally and minimally speaking, a simulation can be characterized as a 
strategy of symbolization taking the form of at least one step by step treatment. 
" is step by step treatment takes time. But the real or simulation time it 
takes does not necessary denote nor imitate a period of time whether from 
the model viewpoint or from the target system one. " is step by step treat-
ment proceeds at least in two major phases:
11. st phase (operative phase): a certain amount of operations running on 
symbolic entities (taken as such) which are supposed to denote either real 
or ﬁ ctional entities, reiﬁ ed rules, global phenomena, etc.
22. nd phase (observational phase): an observation or a measure or any 
mathematical or computational re-use (e.g., in a CS, the simulated 
“data” taken as input data for a model or another simulation, etc.) 
of the result of this amount of operations taken as given through a 
visualizing display or a statistical treatment or any kind of external or 
internal evaluations.
For instance, in an analog simulation, some material or physical properties 
are taken as symbolically denoting other material or physical properties (be 
they of the same kind or not).
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More speciﬁ cally, a CS (computer simulation) is a simulation for which we 
delegate (at least) the ﬁ rst phase of the step by step treatment of symbolization to 
a digital and programmable computer.
In particular, a CS is a “calculus of a model” or a “model in time” when the 
symbolic entities which are operated upon during the operative phase can 
be presented (i.e. rewritten without informational loss) as a unique and for-
mal construct possessing a kind of unity, formal homogeneity and simplic-
ity. Seen from our larger characterization of simulations, it is not necessarily 
the case.
But there is one property of simulations which appears through this focus 
on symbolization: the changing of levels of symbols during the process. It is 
precisely on this point that we can fruitfully reconnect with the Framework 
for M&S.
1.5. Subsymbols and Iconicity in Simulations
In [Phan and Varenne, 2008], we suggested considering the changing sym-
bolhood of symbols at stake in any strategy of simulation. In fact, during the 
observational phase, marks which were ﬁ rst treated as genuine symbols, i.e. 
as denoting entities, are ﬁ nally treated as sub-symbols: so, they are treated at 
another level than the one they ﬁ rst operated. At the end of process, it is 
the result observed which gains a proper and new symbolic nature. And this 
is relatively to this new symbol or system of symbols that the ﬁ rst symbols 
become sub-symbols. Let’s remind that, according to [Smolensky, 1988], 
subsymbols operate in a connectionist network at a lower level than the 
symbols. As such, they can be seen as constituents of symbols. Subsym-
bols “participate in numerical – not symbolic – computation”: the kinds of 
operation on symbols (computations) are not the same at each level. In our 
context of reﬂ ections on simulations, it is not necessary to adopt the realist 
connexionist viewpoint of Smolensky to borrow him this term. Berkeley 
[2000, 2008], for instance, has shown that the subsymbols of Smolensky 
can be interpreted in regard to a larger range of levels and from a relativistic 
point of view.
In view of that, in the particular context of the strategy of a kind of symboli-
zation which is speciﬁ c for a simulation, we can say that some symbols are 
subsymbols relatively to the ﬁ nal symbol resulting from the second phase. 
Consequently, sub-symbolhood appears as a key feature of any simulation. 
But – what is most salient – subsymbolhood appears as a changing and 
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relativistic – not deﬁ nitive nor absolute – property of a symbol used in a 
simulation, during the simulation.
" rough that, we can see that our characterization of simulation leads us to 
similar considerations as the ones presented by Zeigler et al. [2000] (chap-
ter 1): simulation is a question of levels of symbols. But, is it necessarily or 
always a question of levels of systems – or even languages – strictly speaking? 
My suggestion can be now a little more substantiated and anticipated: char-
acterizing a simulation as a relation between levels of systems is a particular 
case of characterizing it more largely as a relation between types of symbols 
through a given step by step treatment. In the former case, we have exact or 
approximate emulation in view (where emulation is deﬁ ned as a particular 
case of simulation, as we will see). In the latter, we have the more general 
case of simulation in view.
First, let’s clarify a bit the notion of iconicity and the correlative notion 
of subsymbolhood. In the 1960’s, it was sometimes said that simulations 
were “iconic modeling” [Frey, 1961]: it was to be understood in the sense 
of iconicity images can have. I.e. simulations were seen to use the same – or 
similar – physical features as the ones possessed by the target system they 
were told to symbolize. " e linguist Olga Fischer [1996] deﬁ nes iconicity 
as “a natural resemblance or analogy between a form of a sign […] and the 
object or concept it refers to in the world or rather in our perception of the 
world”. But she insists on the fact that not all iconicities are imagic. " ere are 
diagrammatic iconicities. For instance, there are relations of symbolization 
where the direct likeness between a signiﬁ er and a signiﬁ ed (such as in the 
onomatopoeia “miaow” for “sound made by cat”) is missing: “instead there 
exists an iconic link between the horizontal relations on the level of the 
signiﬁ er and the horizontal relations on the level of the signiﬁ ed” [Nänny 
and Fischer, 1999]. It is the case in the sentence “veni, vidi, vici” where it is 
the order of events which is iconically denoted through the ordering of the 
verbs. But not all diagrammatic iconicity remains structural as is this last 
one: it can be much more indirect in that it can stem from the semantics of 
the language in use. " ere are semantic diagrammatic iconicities (ibid.). " is 
is this apparently paradoxical indirection of iconicity which is often used in 
the creation of metaphors.
" at is the reason why Fischer [1996] states that an iconic semiotic relation 
is ﬁ rst of all relative to the standpoint of the observer-speaker-interpreter. From 
these considerations, it follows that the most important is the property of an 
iconic relation to be – relatively to a given language or vision of the world – less 
dependent of this language. If we follow such a post-structuralist linguistics, 
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iconity is no more univocally deﬁ ned in terms of a superﬁ cial and implau-
sible absolute resemblance between things and signs nor by an absolute 
homomorphism between pre-deﬁ ned and pre-structured systems (the sys-
tem of signs, on the one hand, and the system of things taken in a slice of the 
reality, on the other). But iconicity is more largely and more fundamentally 
deﬁ ned in terms of independence from a given language.
Hence, if we want to focus on the epistemic power of complex simulations, 
the choice is no more only between interpreting it as a pure material analogy 
or as a pure formal analogy. " e situation now is much more complicated. 
But let’s determine further these relational properties of iconicity and 
subsymbolhood:
We’ll say now that a symbol is  • more iconic than another symbol in 
regard to a given language in which it is inserted and used when its 
function of symbolization (its denotational power) is less dependent 
from the conventional rules of this given language.
Correlatively, we’ll say that a symbol S2 can be interpreted as a  • sub-
symbol of another symbol S1 in regard to a given language iﬀ :
S2 is more iconic than S1 in regard to this given language;1. 
" ere exists a computational operation (a step by step opera-2. 
tion on symbols characterized by a weak combinatorial power) 
on S2 and other symbols of the same level which can produce 
a symbol of the type S1.
It could be objected that this step by step operation on elementary symbols 
is precisely of a conventional nature and that it is, as such, just as any other 
convention-based linguistic rules. " e answer here would be relativistic too: 
this is a matter of degree. When we use iterated computations instead of a 
sophisticated intrications of grammars (i.e. when we use a computerized 
management of symbols instead of speaking or thinking), we have access to 
symbols for which only rules with weak combinatorial power are available.
More precisely, we can deﬁ ne:
" e 1. combinatorial power of a level of symbols as the measure of the 
variety (i.e. the number of diﬀ erent types) of combinations and opera-
tions on symbols which are available at this given level. In a CS, the 
weakness of the combinatorial power is compensated by the number 
of reiterated elementary computations.
" e 2. degree of iconicity as the (relative) measure of the degree of inde-
pendency of the denotational power of a level of symbols relatively to 
the conventional rules of a neighboring level of symbols or language.
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In a denotational hierarchy, we observe that the degree of combinatorial power 
of a level of symbols tends to be inversely proportional to the degree of ico-
nicity regarding the neighboring level.
In Figure 1, I represent the notion of the denotational hierarchy of [Good-
man, 1981]. " en, I draw a parallel between the hierarchy of levels of sym-
bols in such a hierarchy and the similar hierarchies in numerical simulations 
and in agent-based simulations. " e relation of subsymbolization can be 
interpreted in terms of an exempliﬁ cation whereas the relation of denota-
tion can be interpreted in terms of an approximate description.
1.6. Simulations of Models and Simulations of Target Systems
From what has been said, one can explain why the term simulation can 
have diﬀ erent meanings in technical literature. According to [Ören, 2005; 
Yilmaz et al., 2006], for instance, “simulation has two diﬀ erent meanings: 
(a) imitation and (b) goal-directed experimentation with dynamic models”. 
In this section, we will show to what extent our conceptual analyses conﬁ rm 
and explain further this matter of fact.
It has been said earlier that the term simulation may either denote a simula-
tion of a model or a simulation of an external target system with the help of a 
Figure 1. Denotational hierarchy and computer simulations.
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model or a set of models. " e characterization just given can help us explain 
the things further.
First. We are right to say that a computer simulation is a “simulation of a 
model” when its speciﬁ c strategy of subsymbolization essentially is taken as 
a strategy of subsymbolizing the dynamic of the model. From this viewpoint, 
a lapse of time taken in the dynamic of the model is iconically denoted by a 
lapse of time of computation in the CS. An iconic semiotic relation takes 
place here because a lapse of time is denoted through another lapse of time. 
" is iconic relation is not an “imitation” in the proper sense, but it is what 
permits to characterize the second meaning of “simulation” – according to 
[Yilmaz et al., 2006] – as a kind of experimentation. So, temporal iconic 
representations of dynamics of models such as “simulations of models” can 
be speciﬁ cally characterized as “models in time” too. But this particular 
denotation of an aspect of a single model cannot be found in all simula-
tions. So, it cannot be generalized. " e well recognized fact that many CSs 
can be seen as “models in time” is more a regional consequence of the pre-
vailing classical use of a certain kind of subsymbolization based on an iconic 
representation of time than the contrary. I.e.: this is not the fact that a given 
CS is a model in time which entails the presence of a kind of subsymbol-
izing in this CS, but the contrary. Surely, a minimal CS is often based on a 
subsymbolizing of the dynamic of a given model. But a CS has not necessar-
ily to denote iconically the time elapsed in a dynamic of its related model or 
models or system of models to be a simulation.
Second. A CS can be called a simulation for another reason: it can be seen 
as a direct simulation of an external target system and not as a simulation of 
model. Here, we ﬁ nd what [Yilmaz et al., 2006] call the ﬁ rst meaning of 
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simulation: imitation. In this case, it is implicitly assumed that symbols at 
stake in the simulations are entering in some direct iconic relations to some 
external properties of the external target objects.
From this viewpoint, contrary to what prevailed in the ﬁ rst case, lateral and 
external relations between symbols and target entities or target symbols or 
labels have to be taken into account.
In Figure 3, besides the internal relation of subsymbolhood between a sym-
bol of the generic agent and the symbols of speciﬁ c agents, the external 
denotational relations between these symbols and the target objects (be they 
real, constructed or ﬁ ctional) are represented.
" ese external relations of denotation can be seen as iconic or as symbolic 
too. But this is not with the same meanings as the ones introduced in the 
previous case.
For instance, in Figure 3, the target objects   are denoted by  through 
a symbolic external denotation. " is external denotation is symbolic because 
Figure 3. Denotational hierrarchy and external denotations.
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it goes through the intermediary symbol  of which denotational proper-
ties are based on conventional rules (linguistic and social rules at the same 
time).
On the contrary, the target object  is denoted by  through an iconic 
external denotation because no such conventional intermediary is necessary: 
we can see iconicity in this case (i.e. a weak dependence to any language 
convention) in that there is a one by one connection between the speciﬁ c 
symbol and the speciﬁ c target object.
Because this iconicity is decided in regard to any or to a great number of lan-
guages or systems of symbols, it can be said to be an absolute iconicity. " is is 
a great diﬀ erence with the internal iconicity we presented ﬁ rst, which serves 
to characterize any simulation and which always remains relative to a given 
level of symbols or language. In fact, the latter takes place in the relations 
of simulation within a denotational hierarchy of levels of symbols, whereas 
the former denotes symbols or entities which may but have not to belong to 
any explicit denotational hierarchy. Externally denoted entities or symbols 
themselves have not to belong to any hierarchy (nor to the same hierarchy as 
the one of the simulation) to be denoted from a kind of symbol belonging 
to a model and simulation-oriented denotational hierarchy.
As a consequence, neither simple matching nor direct parallelism between 
the M&S-oriented DH and any real (or eventually consensual) hierarchy 
relevant for the target objects is necessary. Another way to coin this is to say 
that it is not necessary for the denotated target objects to form a system to be 
simulated in a complex CS.
In the next section, I will remind some of the key ideas of the Framework 
for M&S. Afterwards I will show how to interpret this conception of M&S 
with the help of the concepts recently introduced. Particularly, I will sug-
gest seeing the FMSA as a speciﬁ c conception of the practice of M&S with 
agents in that it is based on the relatively strong hypothesis that an inte-
gration of some system of target objects within the denotational hierarchy is 
always possible and/or relevant.
2. SYSTEM THEORY AND FRAMEWORK FOR M&S
From the standpoint of the theory of systems, the process of modeling and 
simulation and its variant can be interpreted in terms of relations not only 
between symbols and groups of target entities, nor even between levels of 
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symbols, but always between levels of system speciﬁ cations. As a consequence, 
the system of target objects (more brieﬂ y the target system) – or observation 
frame – is situated in an integrated system-denotational hierarchy. It takes 
place at the level 0 of this hierarchy.
2.1. The hierarchy of the epistemological types of systems
As noted by [Zeigler et al., 2000], the hierarchy of levels of system speciﬁ ca-
tions – i.e. of “levels at which dynamic input/output systems can be described, 
known, or speciﬁ ed ranging from behavioral to structural ” [Zeigler et al., 
2009] – is very similar to the hierarchy of epistemological types of systems 
according to George Klir.
In 1985, after having deﬁ ned the notion of system (see above), Klir gave a 
taxonomy and hierarchy of epistemological types of systems. " is hierarchy is 
derived from the working of 3 primitive notions: “an investigator (observer) 
and his environment, an investigated (observed) object and its environment, 
and an interaction between the investigator and object” [Klir and Elias, 
1985]. Each type of system in the hierarchy is determined by the kind of 
investigation at stake.
At level 0 are what Klir calls source systems, i.e. systems which are the “sources 
of empirical data regarding speciﬁ c attributes of investigated objects”. 
According to Klir, “systems on diﬀ erent higher epistemological levels are 
distinguished from each other by the level of knowledge regarding the vari-
ables of the associated source system”. From this viewpoint, we see that right 
from the start, target objects and correlated empirical data are pre-structured 
in a system. " is is the main reason why this level 0 can be integrated in the 
overall system hierarchy.
At level 1, are data systems, i.e. systems which provide the knowledge of actual 
states of the basic variables within the deﬁ ned support set. At level 2, there 
exists “an overall support-invariant relation among the basic variables of the 
corresponding source system”. " is relation describes “an overall process 
by which suites of the basic variables are generated within the support set”. 
Such systems are called generative systems. At level 3, systems are called struc-
ture systems. Each structure system is deﬁ ned in terms of a set of generative 
systems or lower systems. " ese subsystems of a structure system interact in 
some way (e.g. they share variables…). After the level 4, the system begins 
to have the possibility to change its inner relation. At level 4, speciﬁ cally, the 
characterization of the changes is itself support-invariant: such systems are 
called metasystems. At level 5, the characterization of the change can change 
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too “according to a support-invariant higher level characterization”. Such 
systems are called meta-metasystems. Finally, Klir claims that metasystems of 
higher order can be deﬁ ned. From this viewpoint, note that a source system 
is included in each of the higher level systems: the hierarchy functions as a 
ladder of embedded systems.
2.2. Hierarchy of System Specifi cations
Similarly, as recalled in [Zeigler et al., 2009], in the hierarchy of system 
speciﬁ cations, the systems at level 0 provide only an input and output inter-
face. Levels 1 (I/O behaviour) and 2 (I/O function) of this hierarchy corre-
spond to Klir’s level 1: data systems. In particular, systems of level 1 provide 
input/output pairs whereas systems of level 2 supplement these pairs by the 
knowledge of an initial state. Systems of level 3 specify further a state tran-
sition. In that, they correspond to the generative systems in Klir’s hierarchy 
(Klir’s level 2). Finally, coupled component systems form the level 4 of the 
hierarchy of system speciﬁ cations. " ey correspond to structure systems in 
Klir’s hierarchy (level 3). Note that, on the contrary to Klir’s hierarchy, the 
hierarchy of system speciﬁ cations does not explicitly take into account the 
possibility for the state transition to change. So there appear no higher lev-
els of system speciﬁ cation than the one corresponding to the ﬁ xed structure 
systems of Klir.
According to [Zeigler et al., 2000], the central idea of the hierarchy of Klir 
– which also applies to the system speciﬁ cations hierarchy – is that “when we 
move to a lower level, we don’t generate any really new knowledge – we are 
only making explicit what is implicit in the descriptions we already have”.
Hence, due to the unique hierarchization and to the integration of all the 
target objects within the same hierarchy, a change of level can be seen as 
an explicitation of what is already there, but implicit. As a consequence, 
simulation cannot appear as anything else than a simulation of model as we 
deﬁ ned it above (a set of target objects being always seen as a system-model). As 
underlined by [Zeigler et al., 2000], “in the M&S context, one major form 
of systems analysis is computer simulation which generates data under the 
instructions provided by a model” (my emphasis). " e authors object them-
selves that “one could argue that making something explicit can lead to 
insight, or understanding, which is a form of new knowledge”. But they 
answer that “Klir is not considering this kind of subjective (or modeller-
dependent) knowledge”. Indeed, they conclude that “although no knowl-
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edge (in Klir’s sense) is generated, interesting properties may come to light 
of which we were not aware before the analysis”.
On the contrary, when we climb up the hierarchy (from a level n to a level 
n+m), we need to construct a higher detailed description of a system. In this 
case, we introduce some new knowledge as it appears in epistemic practices 
such as system inference, system design or model construction. " at is: we try to 
ﬁ nd a generative system or structure system which can “recreate the observed 
data” of some source system [Zeigler et al., 2000].
As we can see, from this viewpoint of system theory, simulation remains 
fundamentally an explicitation of mathematical structures (due in particular 
to: 1st the condition of closure under composition, 2nd the strong hypothesis 
of a unique denotational hierarchy). Simulation is always interpreted as a 
calculus of a model. As it appears for any mathematical construct (when 
compared to their numerical simulation), it is the model which is always 
considered as possessing a higher degree of virtuality and cognitive power 
in that it possesses a higher – because a larger – power of possible denotation 
through the supposedly unique denotational hierarchy (to which the target 
objects are all said to belong, at the source system level, in a well-suited 
systemic form).
3. EXPLAINING DIFFERENT EPISTEMIC STATUSES
OF MODELS AND SIMULATIONS
A problem is that practitioners of models and computer simulations in 
social sciences (computational economics, sociology, geography…) do not 
always agree on the fact that CSs are only calculus of models or that they 
only provide some insight of what is at stake in the hidden core of a unique 
model. As shown by a review of the literature made in [Phan and Varenne, 
2008], models can be seen either as conceptual exploration or as experi-
ment. Simulations can be seen as experiments on models or as direct virtual 
experiments or as “credible worlds” [Sugden, 2002].
3.1. Models as virtual experiments or as instruments
Founding its analyses on the notions of denotational hierarchy and iconic-
ity presented above, [Phan and Varenne, 2008] have proposed to explain 
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why and to what extent social scientists (and more generally practionners 
of M&S in the sciences of complex objects) are justiﬁ ed to say that a model 
has an empirical dimension in itself. In some cases, it is because some causal 
factors are denoted in the model through symbols of which external iconicity 
(not internal) is patent and can be reasonably (consensually) recognized as a 
suﬃ  ciently realistic conjecture.
On the contrary, it can be shown that models are seen from a purely instru-
mentalist standpoint (i.e. models are seen as inductive instruments abbreviat-
ing some real experiments) when the modeler thinks that the measure of the 
external iconicity of the operating symbols is weak and when this is their com-
binatorial power at a high level in the denotational hierarchy which is mostly 
requested.
3.2. Simulations as experiments on a model or as conceptual explorations
A simulation being minimally founded on some kind of internal subsym-
bolization, every CS of a model treats it at a sublevel “which tends to make 
its relation to the model analogous to the naïve dualistic relation between 
the formal constructs and the concrete reality” [Phan and Varenne, 2008]. 
" is is because of this analogy between the internal relations of subsymboliza-
tion (within the DH) and the external denotational relations between sym-
bols and target objects that such a CS can be seen as an experiment on the 
model. Conversely, if the goal of the investigation leads to focus on some 
residual but external symbolic (not iconic) aspects of used subsymbols, we are 
authorized to see such a CS of model as a pure conceptual exploration.
It follows that the external validity is no trivial question when we face a com-
plex CS: with a complex CS, it is no more easy to have an overall viewpoint 
on the relations between symbols at stake or between symbols and objects. 
No overall viewpoint can univocally lead us to determine once for all the 
external validity of the CS as a whole. In fact, this external validity depends 
on the strength of the alleged external iconic aspects.
Note that if these external iconic aspects are extremely stabilized and charac-
terized, the simulation can be compared to an exempliﬁ cation. In this case, 
as noted by [Phan and Varenne, 2008], external validity is not far from an 
internal one. " e diﬀ erence is a matter of degree. Seen with the help of 
our conceptual distinctions made above, this case is precisely the one for 
which we are justiﬁ ed to make the strong hypothesis of an integration of the 
target objects not beside but within the denotational hierarchy. Moreover, 
the loose and polysemic relation of simulation becomes a particular one in 
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this extreme case of an exempliﬁ cation of a target through a simulation: 
simulation becomes a rigid relation of emulation. To emulate is not only to 
simulate but to perfectly simulate: i.e. presenting the property to generate 
the same behavior in any circumstances, even in those circumstances which 
have not been gathered and used to validate the simulation. " is is the 
reason why, when Copeland [2004] is reminding the exact meaning of the 
Church-Turing thesis, he is explaining that emulation is not an imperfect 
imitation but a perfect simulation in that the simulating system becomes a 
system which proves to be equivalent to the simulated one.
3.3. Simulations as experiments in themselves
Some scholars claim that computer simulations are not real experiments, 
but experiments in themselves. But in what precise sense? After having paid 
attention to such scholars’ claims and analyzed them in their own right, 
[Phan and Varenne, 2008] have shown that there are at least 4 criteria to 
decide whether a simulation is not only an experiment on the model but an 
experiment in itself.
First, when you see the CS as a direct simulation of some target objects, the 
empiricity of the CS comes from an experiencing, that is, from an obser-
vation and a comparison between the symbols at stake in the CS, on the 
one hand, and the target objects, on the other. External validity enters here 
in consideration. But there are two possible kinds of comparison. Either 
one can postulate an external iconic relation between the resulting symbols 
of the observational phase of the CS and some target objects, or one can 
postulate such an external iconic relation between the elementary symbols 
at stake in the operative phase and some other target entities. " e former 
leads to an empiricity of the CS regarding the eﬀ ects (of the computation), 
whereas the latter leads to an empiricity of the CS regarding the causes (of the 
computation).
Second, when you see the CS not as a simulation of a model (otherwise it 
still can be seen as an experiment on a model as we said above) but as a 
simulation of a set of models, it is not necessary that its empiricity be decided 
only from a direct comparison between the target objects and the symbols 
at stake in the DH. It can be decided from an experimenting on the inter-
nal interactions between levels of formalisms and levels of symbols within 
the (complex) DH. From this viewpoint, as shown by [Phan and Varenne, 
2008], there are two kinds of empiricity: (1) the empiricity due to the intrica-
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tion of the referential routes of symbols, and (2) the empiricity due to the defect 
of any a priori epistemic status.
Note that a CS borrows its empirical characteristic not from a complete 
substitutability with the target objects. It borrows it from a partial substitut-
ability (in the two ﬁ rst cases) or even not from any substitutability at all, 
but from the opacity of the intrication of symbols in the DH (in the two last 
cases).
Now that we have distinguished between kinds of iconic relations (internal 
to a DH, external to a DH), and between types of epistemic statuses for a 
model or a simulation, it is time to determine some epistemological condi-
tions which could be necessary for the formulation of a universal “auto-
mated modeler agent”.
4. THE FMSA AND THE SEARCH
FOR A UNIVERSAL AUTOMATED MODELER AGENT (UAMA)
4.1. Agents, Endomorphic Agents and the universal “automated modeler agent”
As shown by [Zeigler et al., 2009], the notion of endomorphic agent is 
central to the search for a ﬁ rst formulation of a UAMA. Brieﬂ y said, agents 
are objects (in the sense of object-oriented programming) that can have 
perceptions, beliefs, desire and intentions. Agents have been developed in 
distributed AI, but in philosophy of mind too, to match the ﬁ rst BDI mod-
els in the 70’s – see the ﬁ liations of [Putnam, 1960] and [Fodor, 1975]. See 
[Ferber, 1999] too for a thorough presentation.
As noted by [Yilmaz et al., 2006],
Software agents are entities that (a) are capable of acting in purely 
software and/or mixed hardware/software environments, (b) can 
communicate directly with other agents, (c) are driven by a set of 
goals, objectives, and tendencies, (d) possess skills to oﬀ er services, 
(e) perceive their environment, and (f ) can generate autonomous 
behavior that tends toward satisfying its objectives [Ferber, 1999].
In his deﬁ nition, the social scientist Nigel Gilbert [2008] chooses to empha-
size ﬁ rst on human characteristics such as “autonomy” and “social ability”:
Agents are conventionally described as having four important 
features:
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Autonomy1. . " ere is no global controller dictating what an 
agent does; it does whatever it is programmed to do in its cur-
rent situation.
Social ability2. . It is able to interact with other agents.
Reactivity3. . It is able to react appropriately to stimuli coming 
from its environment.
Proactivity4. . It has a goal or goals that it pursues on its own 
initiative.
But they are strong convergences between the two approaches: what is called 
Agent-based Modeling in the computational social sciences – see [Gilbert, 
2008] – is quite the same as what is often called Agent-simulation in the 
modelers and computer scientists’ community – see [Yilmaz et al., 2006]. 
According to [Yilmaz et al., 2006], Agent-based modeling or Agent-simula-
tion can be deﬁ ned as “the use of agents as design metaphors in developing 
simulation models”.
In this context, it is assumed that “simulation models” are models speciﬁ -
cally devoted to simulations understood as imitations of target systems. So 
beware that the meaning on this expression is not based on the general 
meaning of “simulation” but only on its ﬁ rst meaning (according to Ören 
and Yilmaz). Such a model can be a simple set of formal rules which can 
be unrealistic in themselves (in the sense of an external iconic relation) but 
which are conceived in such a manner that their common and interactive 
running leads to a realistic (hence imitative) result, once compared to the 
target system.
Whereas “Agent-based modeling” or “Agent-simulation” is devoted to an 
imitative role of simulations, what [Yilmaz et al., 2006] call “Agent-based 
simulation” refers – on the contrary – to the instrumental role of agents 
formalisms.
Agent-based simulation is the use of agent technology to generate 
model behavior or to monitor generation of model behavior. [Yilmaz 
et al., 2006]
It is important to note that, in this case, the term simulation changes its 
meaning: it is no more to be understood as an imitation of a target system 
but as “a behavior of a model”, as a “model in time” or as an “experimenta-
tion on a model”.
We can explain this distortion by saying that, in such simulations, the 
emphasis is on the internal iconic relations and not on the external ones.
Now, what is an endomorphic agent?
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An endomorphic agent is a particular agent “that contains models of itself 
and/or of other endomorphic agents” [Zeigler et al., 2009].
When we search for a UAMA, we aim at formulating “models of mind” 
which could be incorporated in agents so that these agents could be said to 
emulate some of the human cognitive capacities (ibid.). In particular, the 
theory of the massive modularity of mind [Carruthers, 2006] – because 
oﬀ ering the hope that an easy modeling of a multiplicity of simple modules 
in mind will soon be reachable – could be a way to give a ﬁ rst outline of a 
UAMA.
" e necessity for a suﬃ  ciently evolved agent to construct in his mind 
– sooner or later – a “theory of the mind” of others and of himself can be 
simply and logically demonstrated [Zeigler et al., 2009]. It has been largely 
recognized by evolutionary psychologists too.
From these considerations, we can infer that an endomorphic agent would 
meet the challenge to conciliate the two diﬀ erent kinds of Agent-directed 
simulation. It would have to conciliate the property to be an Agent-based 
model with the property to run an Agent-based simulation of itself (as 
agent). In the Agent, the prescribed Agent-based simulation of itself will 
give rise to a modular representation of itself (most of the times unrealistic 
from its viewpoint), whereas the Agent-simulation will – on the contrary – 
determine a representation of itself as a familiar and somewhat realistic 
agent (“realistic” compared to real external systems).
" e problem of doubling the aspects (even when they are incompatible) 
on a same entity is not inescapable, of course; but it demands some careful 
attention to what kinds of diﬀ erent semiotic relations (internal, external, 
iconic, subsymbolic) are at stake in each case. " is problem becomes all the 
more acute when we intend to build a modeler agent, moreover a “universal 
autonomous modeler agent”.
4.2. The universal autonomous modeler agent
and the “modeler subjective knowledge”
We won’t enter here in the debate about the validity and signiﬁ cance of 
such assumptions in the general project of intelligence modeling. Our goal 
is more modest: it is to show one of the consequences of such an approach 
on the alleged epistemic role of models and simulations.
" anks to our previous analyses and conceptual distinctions, we can under-
stand that the formal construct of a universal endomorphic agent, which 
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would construct by himself – at runtime – a theory of his mind-body, is a way 
for the FMSA to guarantee the continuous integration of the target objects in 
a unique denotational hierarchy, during the whole process of M&S. In fact, 
the system theoretic vision, the constraints of strict embedding between 
levels of symbols and the condition of closure under composition of sys-
tems authorize to take into account and integrate in the hierarchy of system 
speciﬁ cations what Klir nevertheless rejected and called the “subjective (or 
modeler dependent) knowledge”. " is is the reason why it is justiﬁ ed to see 
a real promised land in this new project.
But we have shown above that the relations between the levels of symbols 
within the DH and the relations between symbols of the DH and some target 
objects or target symbols (these latter being based on the modeler depend-
ent knowledge) are not of the same nature: in particular, the former are 
supposed to give rise (sometimes) to relative internal iconicities whereas the 
latter can give rise to absolute iconicities. So, the logical grammars of these 
iconicities – and then of these two types of relations – are not the same. If 
we neglect this diﬀ erence, the diversity and the real coherence of the episte-
mological positions concerning the epistemic statuses of models and simu-
lations among the diﬀ erent practices of M&S in complex sciences remain 
unexplainable.
So it appears that one of the greatest challenges for the search for a UAMA 
could be the careful formulation of this distinction of nature and of stand-
points on symbols and on relations of symbols and target objects for any 
modeled cognitive process. Otherwise, it is not excluded that a simple par-
tially auto-similar and auto-scopic agent (the formulation of which would 
be based on a rough homogeneization of the diﬀ erent kinds of relation of 
denotation) would be another pitfall in the quest for a greater uniﬁ cation of 
the tools and practices of M&S.
5. EMULATION OF SYSTEMS, SIMULATION OF AGENTS
" e last sections have shown that when we adopt the system theory approach 
for the design of agents which would be capable of modelling & simulating 
their world and other agents in a similar way as behavioral and social scien-
tists – or even common people – do in their daily life, we have to make the 
hypothesis that external iconicities could be reduced to internal ones.
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" is hypothesis is strong. " e problem it arises is not far from the one 
posed by Putnam [in 1991] when arguing against the computational view 
on mind (although Putnam himself had been one of the leader of this view 
in the 1960’s): the denotational power of a symbol – or of a given level of 
symbol – not only depends on its insertion in a unique, closed and ﬁ nite 
set – or hierarchy – of symbols but also on the physical and socio-linguistic 
context of this symbol or level of symbols in the real world.
But, according to the suggested approach here, this argument does not suf-
ﬁ ce to condemn us to any relativism or vitalism, nor to any refusal of the 
project of building a UAMA. On the contrary. It serves to make the chal-
lenge more precise and eﬃ  cient.
Accordingly, in this last section, I will show how the use of the distinc-
tion between external and internal iconicities could help us to distinguish 
between an approximate morphism and an imperfect simulation.
5.1. Exact Morphisms, Approximate Morphisms and Kinds of Iconicity
As shown in [Zeigler et al., 2000: chapter 12], from the FMS point of view, 
it can be useful to treat the horizontal relations between systems that belong 
to the same level of speciﬁ cations. A relation which establishes “a corre-
spondence between a pair of systems whereby features of the one system 
is preserved in the other” (ibid.) is called a preservation relation or system 
morphism.
In particular, [Zeigler et al., 2000] introduces morphisms that are “such that 
higher level morphisms imply lower level morphisms”: “this means that a 
morphism that preserves the structural features of one system in another 
system at one level also preserves its features at all lower levels” (ibid.). " e 
existence of this possibility is coherent with two facts: 1) the fact that, from 
this viewpoint, going down the levels in the system speciﬁ cation hierarchy 
“corresponds to a simulation process, i.e. generating the behaviour of the 
model given its structure” [Zeigler et al., 2000: chapter 14; 2] the fact that, 
when simulating, i.e. when going down the levels, our knowledge cannot 
increase at all, but only be rendered more explicit (see above).
In this context, a morphism is said to be exact when all the features of inter-
est in the two systems are exactly preserved. In other words, a morphism 
is exact iﬀ  any of the two systems emulates the other. On the contrary, a 
morphism is said to be approximate when not all features of interest are 
preserved in this relation (ibid.).
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Of course, there can be diﬀ erent kinds of simulations for the same sys-
tem. In computational economics and social sciences, it is often said that 
agent-based simulations of social phenomena can be used to explain, at the 
micro-level, the mechanisms of the social phenomena whereas holistic mod-
els, working at a macro-level, are said to be phenomenological and of an 
instrumental nature. " ese mathematical and holistic models nevertheless 
can be simulated through discretization and other numerical tricks: but the 
ﬁ nite elements which are the bases for such simulations of models are not in 
a relation of external iconicity with some target objects. On the contrary, in 
the case of individual-based simulations, simulated agents can be said to be 
related to such objects through an external iconic relations. Hence, it appears 
that a simulation of agents is not the same as an emulation of systems.
More precisely, it follows that the property to be a relevant simulation at a 
given level is not an intrinsic property which could always be inherited only 
from a position in the hierarchy. In particular, it cannot be inherited only 
by guaranteeing that a system at a higher level is in a morphism relation to 
another system at this higher level, this latter having a relevant simulation, 
at a lower level, for its own.
So, if we do not want to defer each time to a subjective viewpoint of the 
modeller, and if we want to implement endomorphic agents who would be 
automated modelling and simulating agents, there is a necessity to objectify 
and formalize this external relation of denotation. A way to do this could be 
to look for a metric suitable for an objective evaluation of the simulation 
error in the sense valid for a simulation of a target objects.
5.2. Towards a Metrics for Errors in Simulations in regard to external Iconicities
Now that we take into consideration the semantics of symbols at stake, it 
surely appears a challenge to ﬁ nd a metrics which would be appropriate for 
the formulation and the measure of the distance between a desired simula-
tion of a target and the simulation obtained.
Such a metrics would be a useful tool as far as endomorphic agents are sought 
for [Zeigler et al., 2009]: otherwise, how would it be possible to implement 
credible (for behavioral and social scientists) evolutionary endomorphic 
agents without having an idea of how they can assess their own performance 
in modelling and simulating? In this case, the necessity to implement the 
modeler’s knowledge and point of view leads to the necessity to make a place, 
in such agents, to a sensibility to the external iconicities of the models they 
build, beside their sensibility to internal ones or to isomorphisms.
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Another problem is that external iconicity is founded on a weak dependence 
of the denotational power of symbols of interest from any linguistics sys-
tems or any pre-established conventional rules. How can this independence 
be taken into account in a notational system?
But let’s remind that this iconicity remains a matter of degree (even when 
this is seen as “absolute”) and that the diﬀ erence between external validity 
and internal validity remains a matter of degree too, as a consequence. So 
it could be a solution to introduce sets of symbols which could interoper-
ate, but which could not be inserted in the overall denotational hierarchy 
of the M&S process. Such ﬂ oating sets of symbols (seen as ﬂ oating from the 
DH point of view) could be considered as “external patterns of reality” 
or as modules the activity of which has to be simulated from an external 
point of view. Algorithms of activity tracking [Zeigler et al., 2009] could 
be used to simulate these external modules (modules taken as external to 
the DH) as it is not necessary to assume that these modules always belong 
to the same system or system of systems. More generally, it seems necessary 
to integrate explicitly the modelling of the epistemic activity of the UAMA 
(its “epistemology”). And a way to do this would be to track this epistemic 
activity and, moreover, to enable the UAMA to become aware of – and to 
react to – its own epistemic activity.
CONCLUSION
As noted by [Zeigler et al., 2009], the human mind can be seen as the 
“behavior of the brain” [Carruthers, 2006]. " e mind seems fascinating for 
the specialist in M&S in that it has solved for himself the problem of the 
System of Systems integration (SoS), i.e. the problem to integrate systems 
with speciﬁ c functions into a more comprehensive and multifunctional sys-
tem. Hence, it is perfectly understandable that the search for an endomor-
phic automated modeller agent seems so crucial today.
" is paper has ﬁ rst presented an outline of a multi-level referentialist episte-
mology of models as far as complex M&S are concerned. It has shown that 
this multi-level epistemology leads to a very similar presentation of the M&S 
process as the system theory approach adopted for the FMS with Agents 
[Zeigler et al., 2000]. Nevertheless, this distinct presentation has shown too 
that the diﬀ erence between external and internal denotations helps to focus 
on the strong and speciﬁ c hypothesis which is at the basis of the speciﬁ c 
FMS approach: the possibility to integrate the target objects as a system in 
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the denotational hierarchy of symbols – or system speciﬁ cation hierarchy – 
of the M&S process.
" e fact that this strong hypothesis is not always assumed in the works done 
in the context of computational social sciences – and in computational 
complex sciences in general – explains the diﬀ erence between the episte-
mological reﬂ ections of this community (which uses more and more M&S 
based on agents) and the epistemological reﬂ ections of the neighboring 
community concerned with multimodelling, DEVS formalisms and, more 
recently, the FMSA (FMS with Agents). In particular, our epistemological 
distinctions enable to explain why diﬀ erent epistemic statuses still can be 
attributed to their works with agent-based models and simulations by com-
putational economists or sociologists, whereas these distinctions seem to 
have not much meaning in the other community.
In fact, this paper shows that these two communities will have to discuss 
more intensively in the coming years. In particular, it shows that the FMSA 
community will newly and explicitly have to deal with the “modeler’s 
dependent knowledge” (i.e. with the modelling of his epistemology), once 
rejected (as non signiﬁ cant) in the ﬁ rst FMS approach.
Finally, it has been suggested that the challenge for the project of a formula-
tion of a universal automated modeller agent (UAMA) has much to do with 
the search for a way to articulate the internal and system theory approach of 
levels of symbols and the referentialist approach of the relations of denotation 
between symbols and external target objects.
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